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Abstract: Throughout history, human beings have worked on their personal enhance-
ment. Not only improving the living conditions, but also trying to improve the moral 
behavior of people, usually through education. The Transhumanist proposal of moral 
enhancement promises to make us better and understands it as a duty, also because 
of the ethical challenges that present to us. In the following article we explore if that 
is possible and to what extent, taking into account that humans are agents.
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According to Robert Spaemann (2006) humans are different from other 
beings because (1) people are not determined by a ‘biological niche’ but 
form a ‘vital centre here and now’, in reference to which everything else 
acquires its own sense; and (2) humans are ‘agents’ who not only act seeking 
certain aims, but are ‘aware’ of the relationship between their actions and 
purposes. They know that they are responsible for their actions and have 
a special kind of purpose: ‘self-realization’. 
Is human enhancement possible if it comes from the outside?
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Humans feel responsible for the fulfilment of their own lives and know 
that it depends mainly on them. It is not a duty imposed from the outside, 
but it arises from the inside. This kind of ‘imperative’ distances us from our 
primary and secondary interests in order to consider our lives as a whole. 
When it comes to acting, human beings are not limited to mapping strat-
egies for action, subordinating some ends to others, but first and foremost, 
they should and ask themselves: Where does this action or this kind of life 
lead me? What type of person am I turning into? What am I doing with my 
life? Is this the right way to live? Without this approach it is difficult to 
assume that there is a genuinely human behaviour (Herce 2018).
Would this mean that transhumanism or any proposal for human 
enhancement would eventually fail in fostering what is essentially human, 
i.e. moral behaviour?
We humans have a long tradition on human enhancement, which 
includes both successes and failures. We have learned better ways to teach 
languages or climb mountains, to optimize time or travel routes. Among the 
traditional means of moral enhancement, we have civil legislation, socially 
recognized moral exemplars, religious teachings and disciplines, or familial 
upbringing. Well-probed all of them, though not enough by themselves, 
especially if used as a technique.
So, it seems clear that the improvement of external conditions, of the 
environment in which human beings develop, is necessary and works as 
a catalyzer for human enhancement, although it is not enough.
In “Can Prudence Be Enhanced?” Jason Eberl (2018) explores “the 
necessity and feasibility of pursuing methods of moral bioenhancement 
as a complement to traditional means, grounding his analysis within 
a virtue-theoretic framework. Specifically, whether proposed methods of 
moral bioenhancement could facilitate the cultivation of prudence within 
the psyches of moral agents.” And Eberl concludes that “certain means of 
bioenhancement may serve to augment the ability to reason prudentially 
and assist moral agents to align their wills with their higher-order rational 
desires, though such means require higher-order desires to already have 
been formulated independently”. But, where these desires come from if not 
from the methods of moral bioenhacement?
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The answer to this question calls for an agent, in the sense of someone 
conscious and able to determine what is best in one circumstance or another, 
in order to make the right decision.
In principle, we could agree that the better informed the agent is, the 
better decision will make. We wisely look for advice when we feel deeply 
involved in our decisions, biased by our own prejudices or limited by our 
human fragility. We do it with personal trainers, marriage counselors or 
friends, and we know that it works: not always, but more often than not. 
They probably know techniques and know us well, they have relevant and 
additional information, in terms of our possibilities and our performance. 
So, their advice can enhance our lives.
According to this line of work, an artificial intelligence could be a good 
personal trainer: able to know my health status, my basic needs, or my 
learning capacity as to get the best out of me, at least, in some respects. 
This is one of the ideas which Norbert Wiener got across some seventy 
years ago in a book titled “The Human Use of Human Beings.” In this book, 
he gathered a critic to his personal point of view made by a French Dominic 
frère, Père Dubarle. The critic was published for the very first time in Le 
Monde in 1948, and Wiener himself translated it into his book: 
Can’t one imagine a machine to collect this or that type of information, as for 
example information on production and the market; and then to determine as 
a function of the average psychology of human beings, and of the quantities 
which it is possible to measure in a determined instance, what the most prob-
able development of the situation might be? Can’t one even conceive a State 
apparatus covering all systems of political decisions? (...) We may dream of the 
time when a machine à gouverner may come to supply –whether for good or 
evil– the present obvious inadequacy of the brain when the latter is concerned 
with the customary machinery of politics. […] The machines à gouverner will 
define the State as the best-informed player at each particular level; and the 
State is the only supreme coordinator of all partial decisions. These are enormous 
privileges; if they are acquired scientifically, they will permit the State under 
all circumstances to beat every player of a human game other than itself by 
offering this dilemma: either immediate ruin, or planned cooperation. This will 
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be the consequences of the game itself without outside violence. The lovers of 
the best of worlds have something indeed to dream of! […] In comparison with 
this, Hobbes’ Leviathan was nothing but a pleasant joke. (Wiener 1989, 178–179)
This critique describes the potential to create a computer system that would 
gather data from people and would provide feedback to those people in real 
time. The aim would be to put them partially or statistically in a behaviourist 
system. 
Wiener gives credit to Dubarle and answers that, as a thought exper-
iment, one could imagine a global computer system where everybody has 
devices on them all the time, and the devices are giving them feedback 
based on what they did, and the whole population is subject to a degree 
of behaviour modification. But such a society, Wiener concludes, would 
be insane and could not face its problems, although he thought that such 
a future is technologically infeasible.
Does it sound familiar? Despite Wiener’s thought, reality is more 
stubborn than imagination and what seemed just a thought experiment, 
has become a plausible reality. As Jaron Lanier put it: “in the 80s of the 
past century (…) we knew that if we thought of our technology as a means 
to ever more power, if it was just a power trip, we would eventually destroy 
ourselves. That is what happens when you’re on a power trip and nothing 
else”. (Lanier 2018). 
This trip to power has led to what Zuboff has christened as ‘surveillance 
capitalism’ a system which challenges democratic norms and whose machine 
à gouverner, the ‘Big Other’, “is constituted by unexpected and often illegible 
mechanisms of extraction, commodification, and control that effectively 
exile persons from their own behavior while producing new markets of 
behavioral prediction and modification.” (Zuboff 2015)
Of course, the beginning of this power trip, at least, is threatening to 
us and, nevertheless, we are encouraged to continue traveling a path of 
more and more power in which the object of manipulation is the human 
being; with the premise that everything will be for our enhancement, in 
defense of the dignity of the posthuman being, and as an essential step for 
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the survival of the humans (Bostrom 2005). But what does enhancement 
or dignity mean? 
For many people the feeling of having lost control is remarkable. They 
do not feel masters of their own lives, but rather at the mercy of changing 
technological winds. Winds that are not those of biology, because of my lack 
of virtue, but those of others wills that know how to ‘hack’ the behavior of 
large population groups.
It is not easy to determine what really enhances a human being here and 
now, taking into account their whole life, not only from a purely subjective 
point of view, or because a group of people or an AI decide heteronomously 
for him. It is necessary to guess what enhances this human being in the 
broader context of a truly and significant human life. And it cannot be 
determined merely from the outside or merely from the inside. 
What should we do then? Is it more appropriate to follow a set of rules 
or to decide according to the majority or an algorithm? If I decide not to 
be enhanced, is it a good decision? Green (2018) presents a broad overview 
of twelve topics in ethics in AI, including function, transparency, evil use, 
good use, bias, unemployment, socio-economic inequality, moral automa-
tion and human de-skilling, robot consciousness and rights, dependency, 
social-psychological effects, and spiritual effects. We need to stop to think 
and somewhere we have to start.
So, recapitulating my contribution, a more favorable environment for 
human enhancement can be created from the outside. In addition, we can 
get more information through advice or behavioral models to enhance some 
aspects of our personal development. But we cannot make good citizens 
from the outside. We can create an environment where it is easier to develop 
one type of behavior or another, but who or what determines what kind of 
behavior is better for the human being? Similarly, it is not enough to have 
good moral models or receive good advice to make people good, although it 
can certainly help. In addition, who or what determines the type of models 
or tips that enhance human beings? Everyone has to path her personal 
enhancement, discovering what is good or bad at each moment. Even so, 
where does the moral imperative of personal enhancement come from?
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Landing my proposal, I would say that three elements are needed 
for enhancing humans. In the first place, a healthy environment that 
empowers and allows the adequate development of the capabilities of the 
human being. For this, a contact with reality, mediated more intensely by 
technique, would not suffice, if this prevents an authentic real experience 
with the environment. Second, a healthy personal interdependence, which 
allows the development of social human capacities, is necessary. For this, 
it would not be enough with an interpersonal interaction mediated by the 
technique, if this, instead of approaching us, distances us from having 
significant relationships with others. And third, an autonomous and healthy 
involvement of the individual is needed, so that he can lead the construction 
of his own life, not simply as a product of technical improvements, but as 
an agent master of his life, capable of perceiving what really improves her 
as a person.
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